On Separating the Intellect from the Body: Aristotle\u27s De Anima III.4, 429a10-b5 by Sisko, John E.
Binghamton University
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
3-1999
On Separating the Intellect from the Body:
Aristotle's De Anima III.4, 429a10-b5
John E. Sisko
College of William and Mary, siskoj@queens.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient
Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more
information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sisko, John E., "On Separating the Intellect from the Body: Aristotle's De Anima III.4, 429a10-b5" (1999). The Society for Ancient Greek
Philosophy Newsletter. 202.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/202
O n Separating the Intellect from the Body; A ristotle’s TV Anima IIL 4,429al0-b5
John E. Sisko 
College o f W illiam and M ary
<
§ 1 H ylom orphism  and Separable intellect
One o f Aristotle’s more fundamental theories within natural science is that o f hylomorphism: the theory that 
natural, or a t least living, things are fbrm-in-matter. Birds, horses and humans are in some sense analogous to  the snub: 
each is a  this-in-this. So, just as the snub is concavity in a  nose, a  horse (a bird, a human,) is a  (certain) form-in- 
(certain) matter. This basic theory plays a  large role in Aristotle’s De Anima IDA). In the DA, both when assessing 
various psychological capacities and when defining soul in general, Aristotle offers a hylomorphic account. He argues 
that soul is die form o f die body: soul is the organization-for-die-sake-of-firnctioning o f the body, (see DA Π.1-3) And 
so he holds that various psychological capacities are forms insofar as each is an ability o f a physiological organism so 
structured to function for the sake o f its end(s). Thus, to describe his position radier loosely, Aristotle holds both that the 
soul o f perception, or what is traditionally called die perceptual soul, is the form o f our perceptual organs and that the 
soul o f nutrification, or the nutritive soul, is the form o f the digestive tract (together with the circulatory system).
A more thorough explication o f Aristotle’s account o f perception will be o f use here for understanding this 
doctrine. Later it will also be o f service in assessing Aristotle’s treatment o f intellect. I will focus on vision, since 
among the various sense-modalities, this receives the most detailed treatment in the DA. Aristotle holds that the seat o f 
vision is the ensouled eye insofar as die eye has the capacity to receive visible forms (without matter). (424al7-19 with 
419al2-13) This means, as most scholars agree, that the eye suffers a physiological dränge through which the object o f 
perception brings the agent to awareness o f the object’s visible qualities.1 So for we can agree with Aristotle. We 
agree that perception requires physiological dränge. However, whan it comes to the precise nature o f the dränge 
involved in perception, we part ways with Aristotle. He thinks that the change is one o f exemplification and not one o f 
encoding. We, by contrast, think that it is one o f encoding and not one o f exemplification. Aristotle is a perceptual 
realist: he thinks drat there is actually red out there in the world.2 And so he thinks that when one sees red one’s eyes go 
red (that is, the jelly (κόρη) within the eyes goes red). Part o f the body literally takes car the perceptible quality in 
question: the change exemplifies the quality.3 We, or most o f us, do not think that there is redout there in the world. W e 
think that certain m icrophysical interactions - described in terms o f lightwaves and tire activation o f rods and cones - 
form the underlying material story o f vision. We think that the physiological process o f seeing is a process o f encoding, 
rather than one o f exemplifying. And so we think drat when one sees red one’s eyes undergo a material alteration, but 
they do not literally go red. ».
2Although we will refuse to  follow Aristotle on the details o f his account o f perception, we do tend to embrace 
the basic theory o f hylomorphism. We think that living is being able to do certain things and that our actually doing
V
something is, in principle, explained (at least in part) by reference to the body’s doing something: I see with my eyes, I 
walk with my legs, and I think with my brain. So at first blush we are Aristotelians. However, it also turns out that 
when it comes to thought (which we think we do with our brains) Aristotle gives the curious appearance o f not, himself, 
being an Aristotelian. Throughout the first two books o f the DA he repeatedly gestures toward the possibility that 
intellect is separable from the body (see 403al0-l 1 ,411M 5-19,413al2-15 & 413b24-27). And in the chapters o f the 
third book that are devoted to the discussion o f intellect (i.e. chapters 4 & 5), he flat out says “intellect is separable [... ] 
” and ‘th is intellect is separable [... ]and unmixed [ . . . ] ” (429b5 & 430al 7).
By offering diese claims, Aristotle puts us in an awkward position. Here we thought that we were Aristotelians 
and it turns out that by all appearances Aristotle, himself, is not an Aristotelian. The important question is: what are we 
to do with the seeming inconsistency? How is it that Aristotle can appear to be committed to  hylomorphism as a general 
principle and yet also in the specific case ofintellect appear to reject hylomorphism? This is a problem that has captured 
the attention o f a number o f contemporary scholars. The more popular strategies for dealing with this question are two: 
first, (1) we might argue that Aristotle’s commitment to separable intellect arises directly out o f his fascination with 
topics that lie outside o f natural science. Second, (2) we might argue that the seeming problem is a merely seeming 
problem, one that can be explained away as issuing from a misguided approach to  the text, hi accordance with the first 
strategy, (la ) it has been argued that Aristotle’s views on theology and ethics require that he treat intellect as separable.4 
(lb ) It has also been argued that, while writing die chapters on intellect in the DA, Aristotle was still a young student o f 
Plato and thus offered an essentially Platonic account.5 In accordance with the second strategy, (2a) it has been argued 
that separable intellect is not in feet offered by Aristotle as separable from die body but only as separable in abstraction: 
as the rectangularity o f a table is separable in abstraction from its material.6 (2b) It has also been argued that Aristotle 
is, perhaps, not concerned with human intellect when he makes certain claims to separability in the DA, rather he may be 
concerned with God itself (which, following one reading o f Metaphysics ΧΠ.7 & 9, is wholly separate from the 
corporeal world).7
While these strategies may constitute fall-back positions they are fer from ideal. Neither takes seriously 
Aristotle’s general commitment in the DA to explore issues within the context o f natural science, (see 402a4-7, 403b8- 
16 & 412al-16) Ethics, for example, is not natural science.* Nor does either strategy take seriously Aristotle’s 
commitment in the DA to study the capacities o f perishable beings.9 Neither rectangularity nor God is a perishable 
being (the former is a quality and the latter is not perishable).10 So, if  we are to  make sense o f Aristode’s claiming in the 
DA that intellect is separable, we must 0  think) find an interpretative strategy that takes into account the fact that the 
DA is a treatise on natural science (with all that this entails for Aristotle). Here I would like to propose a third strategy: 
(3) the seeming tension within tíre DA is just what it seems: a tension within the DA.11 On the face o f it this is to  say 
very little (except to say that the tension cannot be explained away as issuing from a misguided approach to the text
3rpace 2a & 2b]). However, in its simplicity this strategy opens up a line o f investigation that is little explored. It 
suggests that the rationale for the doctrine o f separable intellect is grounded in Aristotle’s own commitment to the 
principles o f scientific explanation (and so is grounded neither in certain peculiarities o f his own personal histoiy (pace 
lb] nor in theories introduced and explicated in the rather remote treatises cm ethics and theology fpace la]). This, then, 
is my deeper thesis: Aristotle is inclined to reject the hylomoiphic account o f intellect, because he is among ether things a 
good natural scientist and the empirical facts (as he understands them) suggest that a hylomorphic account would be 
untenable.
In offering this view, I am placing the doctrine o f separable intellect within a special category: doctrines which 
constitute exceptions to  Aristotle’s own general principles and yet are offered on the grounds o f empirical considerations. 
This is not a category that I create ad hoc: for in addition to the doctrine o f separable intellect, Aristotle has at least one 
other doctrine that falls within this category: the doctrine o f spontaneous generation. In the Generation o f Animals 
(GA), a work on natural science, Aristotle sets out the theory that certain creatures, most notably shellfish (and certain 
crustaceans), do not come-to-be out o f a process o f re-production via existing mature members o f their species, but 
come-to-be out o f purely material causes, for example out o f the bubbling o f sea-water and mud in the hot sun. (GA 
762al8-32; cf. Metaphysics VII.9, 1034b3-7) This doctrine is an exception to Aristotle’s own standard view o f how 
living things come-into-being. On the standard view, the form o f the nascent creature is that which is passed on from 
its parents (or paraît) through the re-productive process: there are chicks, owing to the natural activities o f chickens, and 
there are kids, owing to  the natural activities o f goats.
However, in his own researches, Aristotle finds that certain facts cannot be explained cm the model o f re­
production. First, he takes it as a feet that barnacles have come-into-being offthe coast o f Rhodes where nothing o f the 
kind had previously existed. (GA 763a26-33) Second, he takes it as a feet that when a large group o f oysters were 
moved out o f their muddy environment on the island o f Lesbos to areas where mud does not collect (owing to fest- 
moving tides) they did not become more numerous, but only increased in size. (GA 763a33-b5) The facts, then, (as he 
sees them) are that barnacles arise without having parents and populations o f mature oysters (i.e. prima fade potential 
parents) do not generate offspring (no matter how long they are left to their own devices). The facts cannot be explained 
on the standard model and so, in order to save the appearances. Aristotle accounts for them by offering the doctrine o f 
spontaneous generation. It is as an empirical scientist that Aristotle introduces this doctrine. Thus, one lesson that we 
may draw from his discussion o f the generation of animals is that Aristotle is not timorous o f acknowledging what the 
data o f experience seems to require and he will offer theories governing special-cases, even when such special-case 
theories are in opposition to his own standard view. Here I want to suggest that this lesson can be applied to the doctrine 
o f separable intellect. Let us now turn to an examination o f the relevant passages.12
§ 2 Aristotle's task: De Anima ΙΠ.4 429al0-13
4Aristotle opens the chapter both by indicating that he is making a fresh start (discussing a new topic) and by 
indicating that certain methodological principles will govern his investigation into the nature o f intellect. He states. 
Concerning the part o f the soul by which it both knows and thinks, [a] whether it is separable in respect 
to extension or is not, but is <only> separable in respect to <its> account, [b] we must consider what 
differentia it has and [c] <we must consider> how thinking ever comes to be. (429al0-13)
Section [a] is formulaic. The question o f whether a given faculty is separable in respect to extension or in respect to 
account is Aristotle’s standard way o f marking the start o f a fresh analysis o f a given psychological faculty.Ij Section 
[c] provides faint signs o f Aristotle’s concern that the study of intellect may pose its own unique problems (and perhaps 
not fit the standard model: hylomorphism).14 It is section [b] that provides the reader with the important sign concerning 
methodology. In his investigation Aristotle will display the differentia o f intellect: he will identify the distinguishing 
characteristics o f noetic activity. Thus, in the investigation he will follow his standard mode o f scientific investigation, 
as is both sketched in DA 1.115 and set out more fully in the Posterior Analytics (APo). He will proceed from what is 
more knowable to u s (at an early stage) to what is more knowable by nature: he will begin by identifying a number o f tire 
properties of that which he is studying and then attempt to explain how these properties can jointly obtain: he will gather 
the data and infer to  the best explanation. In so doing, he will approach knowledge o f file essence o f that which he is 
investigating (here intellect). And he will approach this knowledge, because it is the essence o f a thing that explains its 
properties, (see APo 76bl 1-23)
§ 3 Characteristics of Intellect: De Anima ΙΠ .4 ,429al3-b5
Aristotle now embarks on his positive investigation into the nature o f intellect by introducing two o f its 
distinguishing characteristics. First (1), intellect (being a cognitive faculty: a faculty that judges; see 418al4 , 422a21, 
424a5, 426bl0, 427al8-20 & 432al6) is in rough outline formally akin to perception. Second (2), unlike perception, 
intellect grasps all things. Characteristic (1) has already received some treatment earlier in the DA. Regarding this 
characteristic, Aristotle now states.
O f course, [d] if  thought is like perception, then it will be a sort o f being acted upon by the object o f 
thought or something else o f this so rt [e] Thus it must be unaffected (άτταθές) and receptive o f the 
form (δεκτικόν δε το υ  είδους), that is it will be potentially such as this but not this, and as the 
faculty o f perception is related to foe objects o f perception so will intellect be similarly related to the 
objects o f thought. (429al3-18)
In DA Π.5 Aristotle claims that perception and intellect each have an ενέργεια, an actualization that is a perfection o f a 
nature. From this it follows that active thinking does not require an alteration (άλλοίοοσις) or, if  it does, its alteration 
cannot be of the sort which brings about a change away from a nature. (417b9-16) In this respect intellect, along with 
perception, is unaffected (άτταθές16). Further, he claims that perception requires a  being acted upon, a  being affected, 
through which the faculty (or organ) becomes like its object. (417al8-20) In DA Π.12, he describes this being acted
5upon as a reception o f (perceptible) form without matter. (424al7-21) (This reception o f form is (in part) the process o f 
coming to exemplify the perceptible quality.) Finally in ÏÏ.5, he marks an important dissimilarity between perception and 
thought: while the efficient cause o f perception is always outside o f the perceiver, that o f intellection can be internal; for, 
once we have acquired concepts, we are able to think on our own whenever we wish. (417b 19-28) In our passage 
(429al3-18, quoted above), Aristotle reminds the reader o f the specific formal similarities (and dissimilarities) between 
perception and intellect introduced in Π.5 and further indicates that the Π.12 refinement o f the account of perception will 
have an analogue in the account o f intellect. In section [d], instead o f identifying the object o f thought as the efficient 
cause, he shows that a more refined account may be needed: it is perhaps “something else”, not the mere object o f 
thought, that is the efficient cause of thought. In section [e], he shows that both the Π.5 position that thought is 
unaffected and an analogue o f the Π. 12 refinement for the account o f perception will be at play in shaping his theory o f 
intellect: just as perception is a reception o f form, so is intellection.17
Characteristic (2) - intellect grasps all things - appears to be new in the DA (although, as we shall see, it is in 
keeping with a methodological principle that is set forth earlier in the DA). Aristotle now introduces this characteristic 
and begins to draw out the implications of its conjunction with characteristic (1). He states.
Thus, since [f] it thinks all things, [g] it must be unmixed, ju st as Anaxagoras says, in order for it 
to rule, that is in order for it to know [h] for the alien <form> present along with it hinders and 
obstructs i t ■[...] (429al8-21)
The claim in [fj, that intellect grasps all things, is in harmony with a methodological principle that Aristotle 
develops in DA II.4: the faculty-function-object condition (FFO condition).18 In that chapter, Aristotle asserts 
that activities and functions are prior in account to faculties and that objects are prior in account to  activities and 
functions, (see 415al4-22) The FFO condition, then, requires that a psychic faculty be defined in term s o f its 
function and its function in terms o f its objects. It follows analytically from  this condition that intellect is 
receptive of the objects o f intellect: intellect (νους) is the faculty that is receptive o f intelligible objects (νο η τά ) 
and any object that is not o f the sort to be received by intellect is not an intelligible object. However, this alone 
gives us no insight into the nature o f object o f thought: the FFO condition is a general principle guiding the 
explanation o f any given psychic faculty and, as such, it leaves object o f thought open as a placeholder which 
m ust be given content from elsewhere.19 So, while the FFO condition helps us to  see that A ristotle’s claim, in [f|, 
amounts to the assertion that thought thinks all objects o f thought,20 we m ust look beyond the FFO condition in 
order to  better assess the implications o f the claim.
Aristotle does not (in the DA) offer a  precise account o f the shared nature o f objects o f thought, but he 
does offer a broad classification o f such objects. He holds that to  think is to  be fully active in respect to  
knowledge and th at knowledge (in the strict sense) is o f universals. (417bl6-23) Thought, then, (in the strict 
sense) is o f universals. Further, he holds that we entertain universals from  w ithin the three subaltern garera o f the 
intelligible: the theoretical, the practical, and the productive.21 As theoretical thinkers, we entertain those
6universals which are the objects o f mathematics (the objects o f arithmetic, geometry, etc.), natural science (the 
objects o f botany, zoology, etc ), and metaphysics. As practical thinkers, we entertain universals pertaining to  
human conduct (in the areas o f political science, household management, etc.). And as productive thinkers, we 
entertain those universals which are the objects o f the creative disciplines (the objects o f carpentry, medicine, 
etc.). Thus, for Aristotle, the objects o f thought constitute a rich, complex and diverse group. And so one 
implication o f the claim  that intellect grasps all things is that intellect must have the power, breadth o f reach and 
adaptability o f functioning that is requisite for coming to grasp all objects from within this varied group.
In our passage (429al8-21, quoted above), Aristotle brings the model o f reception o f form to  bear on the 
notion that intellect grasps all things: he works within the project o f inferring to  the best explanation by assessing 
how it is that these two characteristics can jointly obtain within intellect. Ultimately, the main issue is how to  
accommodate the power, breadth and adaptability o f intellect within the model o f reception o f form which, in the 
case o f perception, brings with it a num ber o f forceful constraints. Thus, in order to  assess the arguments by 
which Aristotle attem pts to  resolve this issue, we must first make explicit the nature o f the constraints that are 
imposed by the model o f reception o f form in the case o f perception.22 Here the model imposes three constraints.
Constraint (1): in respect to  the successful reception o f particular forms, the organ o f perception m ust be 
by nature trans-form al: its nature m ust be such that it does not exemplify any o f the forms that it is in principle 
capable o f receiving. This constraint is operative in different ways for different types o f sensory modalities. For 
the distal senses (sight, hearing and smell), the constraint demands that each organ be wholly free o f any o f the 
forms which it could in principle receive (or exemplify). The eye, for example, m ust be colorless, if  it is to  come 
to  exemplify its special objects: if  the eye is to go red (or green or blue), it m ust in its natural state be without 
color (it must be transparent). For the proxim al senses (the modalities o f touch: touch and taste), the constraint 
demands, not that each organ be entirely free o f any o f the forms which are among its special objects, but that, 
since the organ itself must exemplify certain tactile qualities, it must lack the capacity to  receive a form which it is 
currently (by nature) exemplifying. (So, one cannot come to  the tactile awareness o f the tem perature o f an 
external object, if  its tem perature is the same as the tem perature o f one’s body; for, i f  one currently exemplify that 
tem perature, one cannot come to exemplify it: one cannot receive what one already has.) So, the proxim al senses 
will have blind-spots, (see DA 423b30-424al0)
Constraint (2): in respect to the scope o f a particular organ o f perception, the material constitution o f 
each organ limits it to  the capacity to  come to awareness o f only a particular species o f the perceptible (we see 
with our eyes, we hear with our ears: but we neither hear with our eyes nor see with our ears). Each organ is 
formed for the purpose o f functioning for the sake o f its own (limited) end and so the m atter o f each organ is 
specifically suited to  the organ’s being able to  so function. The m atter o f each sense organ is not suited to 
function for the sake o f the (limited) a id s o f any other sense organ.23
7Constraint (3): in respect to  the failure to receive particular forms, each organ, because o f the nature o f 
its m aterial constitution, will lack the capacity to receive certain specifiable perceptibles within its own modality. 
W hile animal species will differ in respect to  the range o f the perceptibles o f which they can become aware (e.g. 
Laconian hounds have a keener sense o f smell than humans (GA 781b2-13) and humans have a keener sense o f 
touch than any other creature (DA 421a21-23)), each species must, in respect to  each sensory m odality (which it 
possesses), have a limited range. The range o f a given organ will be limited in a number o f ways: an object will 
go unperceived, i f  (type a) it is too distant from the perceiver (this, o f course, will apply only to the distal senses), 
or (type b) if  it is too feint, or (type c) if  it is too intense. In addition, certain parts o f perceived objects will go 
unperceived, i f  (type d) they are too rich in minute detail. One o f these sorts o f failure (to perceive) is not a 
failure o f the organ per se. Failure to  perceive distant objects (type a) is both a function o f the external medium 
(one cannot see as fer on a foggy day as on a clear day) and a function o f the shape o f certain bodily parts that are 
associated with perception. (So, Laconian hounds have a keener sense o f smell, because they have long nostrils 
and quadrupeds can hear more distant sounds than can birds, because the latter have only the auditory passage, 
while the form er have this and the (external) ear as well; see GA 731al4-21 with PA 657al2-24.) The remaining 
sorts o f perceptual failure are failures o f the organ per se. One feils to see minute detail (typed), because no 
sense organ can be perfect in its purity (no organ is a perfect m irror o f the outside world24). One feils to  perceive 
feint perceptibles (type b). because these lack sufficient causal power to  bring about an alteration within the organ 
o f perception. (GA 779b35-780a9) And one fails to perceive (certain) intense perceptibles (type c). because the 
intense alteration which these bring about in the organ ruptures its m aterial constitution and destroys it. (see DA 
435M 3-15) Connected with these last two types o f failure (types b & c) is the additional failure to  perceive 
relatively faint perceptibles, after perceiving relatively intense ones, (type e) This failure is due to  the lack o f 
sufficient causal power in the feint perceptible to bring about an alteration within the organ, given the presence 
there o f an intense alteration, brought about through the prior agency o f an intense perceptible, (see DA 429a31- 
b3 & GA 780al0-13) These, then, are the constraints imposed by Aristotle within the study o f intellect owing to 
its kinship with perception.
Let us now examine A ristotle’s^ assessment o f the impact which these constraints have upon the 
characteristic that thought is capable o f thinking any object o f thought. In section [h], Aristotle brings constraint 
(1) to  bear on the characteristic: he supposes that if  intellect were to  possess a form prior to thinking, then this 
form would hinder its ability to  receive its objects.25 And he infers that, since intellect is capable o f receiving any 
intelligible object, it must be form less, yet capable o f receiving forms. In section [g], he draws a tentative 
inference from the conclusion that intellect m ust not possess a form: he asserts that intellect is, as Anaxagoras 
says, unmixed.26 This tentative inference to the claim that intellect is unmixed is strengthened ju st a few lines 
later, when Aristotle states.
[i] So, it is reasonable (εύλογον) to  consider it [intellect] not to be mixed with the body; [j] for 
< if it were>, it would come to  have some quality, <like> either cold or hot, and [k] it would even 
have an organ, as the perceptual faculty does; but now intellect has no organ. (429a24-27)
In section [j], Aristotle supplies the candidate qualities - hot and cold - to further illustrate the impact o f constraint 
(1). I f  the organ o f intellect were mixed with the body, it would have certain perceptible qualities, say hot or cold, 
and thus its ability to  receive its objects could be limited: it might fail to  have the capacity to  think all things 
insofar as it might suffer from blind-spots. This consideration does not force Aristotle to  embrace the view that 
intellect is not mixed with the body. It is the proximal sense modalities alone that have blind-spots (owing to the 
necessary presence o f tactile qualities within their respective organs). The distal senses are not constrained in this 
way. Thus, since Aristotle has not argued in support of the view that intellect is somehow more akin to the proximal 
sause modalities than to the distal ones, his exploration into the issue o f how constraint (1) inpacts upon the notion that 
intellect grasps all things generates no conclusive result.27 At this stage in the larger investigation, Aristotle is budding a 
case which suggests that intellect is sparable from the body. He has not unearthed conclusive support for the thesis.
In section [kj, Aristotle brings constraint (Ί) to  bear on the notion that thought thinks all things. I f  
intellect were instantiated in a material organ, it might be limited in scope: it might be limited to  the reception o f 
one subaltern genera o f the intelligible as opposed to the others (as each organ o f perception is lim ited to  one 
sensory modality as opposed to  the others).2* This consideration suggests that intellect is unmixed w ith the body. 
But as section [i] makes clear, Aristotle is not committed (at this stage) to  the notion that thought is unmixed (or 
separable). At this stage he considers the view to be reasonable (εύλογον): he holds it to  have a certain 
plausibility.
It is constraint (3) which, for Aristotle, most forcefully suggests (and all but conclusively supports) the 
thesis that separability is (part of) the essence o f intellect. Aristotle states,
[1] That the unaffectedness o f the perceptual faculty differs from that o f the intellect is made 
manifest upon <a consideration of> the organs o f perception and perception <itself>. For the 
perceptual faculty loses its ability to  perceive after <exposure to> an intense perceptible, as with 
sound after big noises, and after strong colors and smells <it is> neither able to  see nor able to  
smell; but whenever intellect thinks some intense intelligible, it is not less able to  think the inferior 
ones, rather it is better able to  do so; [m] for the perceptual faculty is not without the body, but 
intellect is separable <ffom the body>. (429a31-b5)
In section [1], Aristotle asserts that the cognition o f intense intelligibles, far from impeding our ability to  think 
inferior ones, seems to  make us better able to  think them. This is in marked contrast to  the data on perception; 
for, when we perceive intense perceptibles our ability to perceive feint ones is impeded (constraint 3. type e). The 
distinction that Aristotle offers here between intense and inferior objects o f thought is the same distinction that he
9develops in M etaphysics 1.2 between more accurate (άκριβέστερον) or superior (ά ρ χ ικ ω τέρ α ν ) knowledge 
and subordinate (ύπερετούσ ης) knowledge. In M etaphysics 1.2 he claims that the most accurate or most 
knowable objects o f thought are first principles and causes. Further, he claims that it is through knowledge o f 
these that the particulars which fell under them come to be known, (see 982al3-18; cf. APo 72a26-38). Thus, in 
section [1], Aristotle points to  a conspicuous feet about our cognitive lives: when we know principles and causes 
within a given domain we are better able to judge other things which fell within that domain. It is clear that, in 
this respect, intellect cannot be governed by constraint (3). It cannot be so governed, because one consequence o f 
th is constraint is that material instantiation leaves a faculty vulnerable to  the destructive forces o f intense objects. 
Intellect, unfezed in its command o f principles and causes, lacks one im portant sort o f affectedness that is suffered 
by perception and this lack o f affectedness, Aristotle suggests, is due to  intellect’s having an immaterial nature. 
So, Aristotle infers (in section [m]) that intellect is separable from the body: intellect, with its power, breadth and 
adaptability o f functioning, is (unlike its kindred faculty: perception) unmixed and separable, not the actuality o f 
any part o f the body whatsoever.
From our investigation, it is clear that the (initial) project o f DA ΙΠ.4 fits squarely within A ristotle’s 
standard methodology o f scientific investigation. He shows that there is a topic o f investigation: intellect. He 
introduces distinguishing characteristics: intellect is formally akin to  perception and it grasps all things. And he 
infers to  the best explanation, offering the only account which seems to  explain how these characteristics jointly 
obtain: he saves the appearances by separating the intellect from the body. So, it is his standard scientific 
methodology which, together with the empirical facts, draws Aristotle towards a special-case theory for intellect: a 
theory that is in opposition to his own general theory for explaining psychological capacities (hylomorphism).
§ 4 G etting the Facts R ight: A M oral
Aristotle seems to have the facts on intellect wrong. First, he has the data on perception wrong (the 
m aterial process o f perception is one o f encoding and not one o f exemplification) and for this reason he mistakenly 
supposes that if  intellect were mixed with the body this would require that thought be a process o f exemplification 
(in the appropriate organ) rather than a process o f encoding. The merits o f an encoding thesis, in contrast with an 
exemplification thesis, are that it would allow Aristotle to  do away with the problem o f blind-spots (since what 
exemplifies a quality can also encode it) and it would allow him to  circumvent the problem o f intense intelligibles 
(since the encoding o f an intense object need not itself involve intense m aterial changes). However, Aristotle is 
clearly worried both about the possibility o f blind-spots and about the problem o f intense intelligibles. So, we 
cannot suppose that he gives any serious consideration to  an encoding thesis within this investigation.29
Second, Aristotle mistakenly takes the linguistic parallel between intense objects o f perception and intense 
objects o f thought to  imply that if  intellect were mixed with the body there would also be a problematic 
physiological parallel between the affectedness o f active perception and the affectedness o f active thought. In the
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Topics, he wam s his own students to  be on the lookout for th is very sort o f inferential error. In the context o f 
discussing the role o f homonyms in dialectic Aristotle warns that the same term  may in different circumstances 
have different contraries and that this shows that a term  occurring in two such circumstances will not have the 
same meaning in each, (see Topics 106al-23) In the Topics, his example is the sharp (οξύς). Its contrary in 
respect to music is the flat (βα ρύ), but its contrary in respect to m atter is the dull (άμ βλύ). Accordingly, 
Aristotle claims that sharp does not have the same meaning in respect to  music as it does in respect to  m atter. 
Now, in DA III.4 Aristotle uses the same term  (σφ όδρα) for the intensity o f both perceptibles and thinkables. 
However, he does not use the same term  for their respective contraries. The inferior intelligibles are said to  be 
υποδεέσ τερ α , while the weak perceptibles are said to  be either άσθενής or μικρός. He never term s the former 
άσθενής or μικρός and he never term s the latter υ π οδεέσ τερ α . This might suggest that intense does not have 
the same meaning in respect to  perception as it does in respect to  thought. For this reason, Aristotle should be 
more cautious about the implications o f the linguistic parallel between σ φ όδρα  thoughts and σ φ όδρα  
perceptibles.
Finally, it is unfortunate that in assessing the impact o f constraint (3) upon the thesis that intellect grasps 
all things Aristotle draws only a comparison between thought and perception as full actualities. For, while 
knowledge (already won) o f causes and principles does make it easier to  properly judge other things, the process 
o f coming to  win over such knowledge (o f principles and causes) is often both painful and fatiguing. And, even 
though Aristotle does elsewhere acknowledge this feet (see M etaphysics II. 1, 993b9-l 1), it is clear that its further 
consideration in the DA would suggest a revision o f the theory o f intellect. Exposure to  intense perceptibles is 
physiologically taxing, but then so is the process o f coming to  leam  principles. This physiological parallel 
between affectedness in perception and affectedness in thought suggests that the general theory for explaining 
psychological capacities (hylomorphism) may in the end be adequate as a model for explaining thought. At the 
least it suggests that thought has a greater degree o f kinship with perception than Aristotle acknowledges in the 
opening section o f DA III.4.
In light o f this investigation one could argue for the restoration o f the account o f intellect to  Aristotle’s 
standard model (hylomorphism) on grounds that make use o f A ristotle’s own scientific methodology: one could 
argue that, once we get the facts right, a plausible, and substantially Aristotelian, hylomorphic account o f intellect 
becomes available to  us. However, when we consider the obvious difficulties with the argument for the 
separability o f intellect (hot necessarily A ristotle’s failure to  consider an encoding thesis for thought, but certainly 
his reliance on the linguistic parallel between intense perceptibles and intense intelligibles), together with the 
hypothetical nature o f the beginning o f the argument (at 429a 13) and the larger context in which the argument is 
placed, another m oral suggests itself. It may that Aristotle develops the theory o f separable intellect as a problem
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which demands further discussion: it may be that, while Aristotle is initially drawn (for scientific reasons) towards 
the view that intellect is separable, he (ultimately) strives towards a more hylomorphic account.
Aristotle is clearly aware that the theory o f separable intellect is not without its own difficulties. One 
difficulty is that o f how intellect is to come to possess its objects. These objects first exist (potentially) in m aterial 
things, but m aterial things (it would seem) share no underlying generic sameness with separable (immaterial) 
intellect. So, upon consideration o f his own account o f agency and patiency, which requires that agent and patient 
hold something in common (see Generation and Corruption 1.7), it becomes unclear to  Aristotle how it is that 
separable intellect, having nothing in common with anything else, is to ever come to  think, (see DA III.4, 429b21- 
26)30 Aristotle, then, is not entirely at ease with the theory o f separable intellect. Further, it is plausible that part 
o f his later discussion o f intellect (in DA III.5-8) is aimed at resolving problems within his initial account and it is 
plausible that he aims at resolving these problems by establishing the dependence o f thought upon the body. In 
DA III.5, Aristotle introduces the active intellect and the passive intellect. These, on one plausible interpretation, 
are the efficient and material cause o f thought respectively. Aristotle does not claim  o f passive intellect, as he 
does o f active intellect, that it is separable, rather he claims that it is perishable, (see 430al7  & 430a4-25) This 
suggests that passive intellect is more closely linked with the body than is active intellect and this, I take it, is a 
sign that Aristotle strives towards a more hylomoiphic account o f intellect in DA III.5. Further, in DA III.7-8, 
Aristotle argues for the thesis that episodes o f thought are dependent upon the use (or activation) o f images 
(φ α ντά σ μ α τα ). Images are, for Aristotle, m aterial items stored in the common sensorium . (see De Memoria 
450a26-bl 1) So, this thesis requires that material change (bodily change) is a necessary condition for episodes o f 
th o u g h t/1 This, I take it, is a sign that Aristotle strives towards a more hylomorphic account o f intellect in DA 
III.7-8. So, both in DA III.5 and DA ΠΙ.7-8 we find elements within Aristotle ’s discussion o f intellect that 
suggest he ultim ately strives to ease the tension between his initial account of'in tellect in DA III.4 and his 
standard model for explaining psychological capacities (hylomorphism). The question o f whether Aristotle 
succeeds in resolving this tension must, however, be left for another d a y /2
1 Myles Bumyeat has argued that, for Aristotle, there is no physiological change (or material alteration) involved 
in the process of perceiving. See his “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still credible? A Draft”, in Nussbaum and 
Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1992), pp. 15-26, and ‘“Aristote voit du rouge et entend: 
combien se passe-t-il de choses? Remarques sur le De Anima, Π, 7-8”, Revue Philosophique. 1993, n.2, pp.263-280 (This 
paper has also been published in English as an Additional Paper, “How much happens when Aristotle sees red and hears 
middle C?”, in the 1995 paperback edition of Nussbaum and Rorty, pp.421-434.) I have argued against Bumyeat’s thesis 
in my “Material Alteration and Cognitive Activity in Aristotle’s De Anima”, Phronesis. XLI (19%), n.2, pp. 138-157. T. 
K. Johansen argues in support of Bumyeat’s thesis. See his Aristotle on the Sense-Organs. Cambridge University Press, 
1998. Also see my review of Johansen in Classical Review (forthcoming 1999).
2 Aristotle defines color as follows: “ [...] color is universally capable of exciting change in the actually 
transparent, that is, in light; this being, in fact, the true nature of color”. (418a31-b2; trans. Hicks) This suggests that 
color is not a secondary quality (in Locke’s sense) and that it has causal powers.
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3 This exemplification thesis has been forcefully argued by Richard Sorabji. See both his “Body and Soul in 
Aristotle”, Philosophy. 49 (1974), pp.63-89; and his “Intentionality and Psychological Processes: Aristotle’s Theory of 
Sense-Perception” in Nussbaum and Rorty, 1992, pp. 195-225. Stephen Everson has argued in support of the 
exemplification thesis in his Aristotle on Perception. Oxford University Press, 1997. I discuss Everson’s principal 
arguments in my “Alteration and Quasi-Alteration”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. XVI (1998), pp.331-352. The 
opposed encoding thesis has been argued by Deborah Modrak (Aristotle: The Power of Perception. University of Chicago 
Press, 1987) and Jonathan Lear (Aristotle and the Desire to Understand. Cambridge University Press, 1988).
4 Kathleen Wilkes, Phvsicalism. Humanities Press, 1978. See especially pp. 115-116.
5 Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development, Oxford University Press, 1934, 
pp.332-334 and W.D. Ross “The Development of Aristotle’s Thought”, Proceedings of the British Academy. 43 (1957), 
pp.65-67.
6 Michael Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle , Yale University Press, 1988, especially chapter 5. 
Wedin’s thesis directly concerns the active intellect of DA IH.5. However, since Wedin holds that the discussion in DA 
III.5, constitutes a refinement of the account in DA ΙΠ.4, he is committed to the view that Aristotle explains the thesis 
(argued for in IH.4) that intellect is separable in terms of the separability of active intellect (in III.5).
7 Jonathan Barnes, “Aristotle’s Concept of Mind”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 72, (1971-72), 
pp. 101-114.
8 One element within the groundwork of Aristotle’s ethical system in his psychological theory (see Nicomachean 
Ethics (NE) 1.7 & 1.13). So, while Aristotle’s psychology is not dependent on his ethics, his ethics is (in part) dependent 
on his psychology.
9 In DA II.3, Aristotle sets out a hierarchical nesting of the psychic capacities. He hold that all perceivers must 
function nutritively and that all thinkers must function perceptually, (see 414b28-415al3) This nesting shows that within 
the DA Aristotle is not interested in accounting for the life of God, since his God (that is, his prime mover) is neither 
capable of perceiving nor capable of functioning nutritively, (see Metaphysics ΧΠ.9)
10 Wedin argues that the separability of active intellect is akin to the separability of mathematical objects: active intellect 
is not actually separate from matter, but is can be thought of as if it were, (see Wedin, 1988, pp.191-193) In Metaphysics VL1, 
Aristotle claims that mathematical objects can be thought of as if they were changeless (ακίνητα) (1026a9). Further, he glosses 
‘changeless’ with ‘eternal’ (àtSiov) (1026a9-10). Wedin asserts that this is the sort of etemality that Aristotle ascribes to active 
intellect (at DA ΙΠ.5,430a23). There are at least two problems with this view. First, Aristotle does not daim that active intellect 
is as-if eternal, he simply says that it is eternal. Second (and more importantly), active intellect is the efficient catase of thought. 
(This is required by Aristotle’s claim that active intellect is related to passive intellect as art is related to matter; see DA ΙΠ.5, 
430al0-13.) Active intellect, thus, plays a role in the pursuit of an end (τέλος). Abstractions, however, do not seek an end. (see 
Parts of Animals (PA) 1.1 641M1-15) They are not productive. Thus, active intellect cannot be adequately understood as an 
abstraction.
11 This does not imply this same tension cannot be found elsewhere in the Corpus. It can be found in the 
Generation of Animals (GA). In GA Π.3, Aristotle asserts that the principle of all soul, except intellect, is not without 
matter, while intellect enters the developing fetus, not via a material vehicle, but “from outside”. (737a8-10) His rationale 
for this assertion seems to be the bald declaration that “no bodily activity has any connection with the activity of reason”. 
(736b27-28) If we are to find an argument in support of this view, I suspect we shall find it in DA ΙΠ.4.
12 In the remainder of this paper, I offer an account of those passages from DA ΙΠ.4 that are crudal to 
understanding the rationale behind the doctrine of separable intellect: my focus is on 429al0-b5. I do not offer anything 
approaching an exhaustive account of the chapter.
13 In DA ΙΠ.9, Aristotle begins his treatment of the faculty of desire by asking “whether it is some one part of the soul, 
which is separable in respect to extension or in respect to its account or whether it is the whole soul” (432al9-21) and in DA Π.2, 
after offering what is his ultimate definition of soul, he introduces an account of various psychic faculties by noting that “whether 
each one of these is a soul or part of a soul and, if a part, whether it is only separable in respect to its account or is separable in 
respect to place also is a question [...] ” (413bl3-15).
14 It should be noted that this section carries greater force than is suggested by some of the modem English 
translations. Aristotle does not simply state that it is an aim of his discussion to explain the process of thinking: he does not write 
“σκεπτέον [...] ττώς γίνεται το  νοεΐν” - “we must consider [...] how thinking comes about” - as is sometimes suggested (This 
is Hicks' translation. Hett fares no better with his “how thinking comes about”.) Rather he writes “σκετττέον [...] ττώς 
ποτέ γίνεται το  νοεΐν”; his aim is to consider how it is that we ever come to think. He is already concerned that his standard 
model will not apply in the case of intellect.
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15 In DA 1.1, Aristotle claims that knowledge of attributes (and properties) is an aid towards gaining knowledge 
of essence (402b21-22) and he indicates that the search the essence (or definition) will appropriately begin with an 
account of attributes (402b22-25). Further, he claims that the mark of whether a definition is scientific (i.e. non-dialectical) is 
whether it leads to knowledge of attributes (402b25-403a2).
16 Aristotle does not actually use the word άτταθέζ in Π.5. Rather he claims that intellect should be said not to 
suffer (ουδέ ττάσχειν; 417bl3-14). This is equivalent to the claim that intellect is άτταθές.
17 My account makes it seem as though [d] and [e] are simple assertions. But this is not the case: [d] is a 
conditional statement and the description of intellect that I have offered is gleaned from the consequent clause in [d] and 
from [e], which is also dependent upon the antecedent in [d]. Thus my account relies on the assumption that Aristotle 
implicitly asserts the antecedent of [d]. One might argue that this supposition is not justified. It could be that the 
conditional structure of [d] is a sign of trepidation (on Aristotle's part) over whether intellect is in fact like perception. I 
suggest that Aristotle is at the beginning of III.4 unsure about how far the analogy with perception will take him and he is 
in some way unsure about the conclusion he draws from the analogy, but he is not worried about whether perception and 
intellect are akin in the specific ways that are addressed in [d] and [e]: nowhere in the DA does he reject either the notion 
that thought is a sort of being acted upon or the notion that it is a reception of form (although, in ΙΠ.5 he suggests that 
thought is not simply a sort of being acted upon and that the efficient cause of thought goes beyond the mere reception of 
form). Aristotle begins his discussion of intellect with a conditional statement because he is going to set out an important 
disanalog}7 between perception and intellect (at 429a29-b5) and so he wants to be careful not to appear to think that the 
two are in all respects analogous. (Here we should also note that some of Aristotle’s predecessors took perception and 
intellect to be the same faculty; see DA Π Ι.3,427a21-29.)
18 On the FFO condition, see Wedin, 1988, pp.l3ff.
19 In the same manner the FFO condition leaves object of perception (αισθητόν) open as a placeholder which 
must be given content from elsewhere. Aristotle provides this content in DA Π.6-11, where he offers accounts of the 
various sensory modalities, beginning in each case with a treatment of the objects that fall within each modality.
201 would also suggest that “ιτά ντα ” at 429al8 picks up on “τά  νοη τά ” which comes earlier in the same line. 
If this is correct, then “thought thinks all things” quite straightforwardly means “thought thinks all objects of thought”. I 
would like to thank Derek Kershaw for bringing this point to my attention.
21 See Metaphysics VI. 1 and Nicomachean Ethics VI. 1-7.
22 Christopher Shields has recently emphasized the importance of bringing the distinction between encoding and 
exemplifying to bear in assessing Aristotle’s treatment of intellect. (See his “Intentionality and Isomorphism in 
Aristotle”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy (BACAP) XI (1997), pp.307-330) Shields 
holds that the distinction itself derives from Brentano’s treatment of the difference between taking on a quality physically 
and taking on a quality objectively. (Shields, p.319) Martin argues that the distinction between encoding and 
exemplifying is not the distinction that concerns Brentano. (See his “Commentary on Shields”, BACAP (1997), pp. 331- 
334.) Whether or not the distinction has a heritage in Brentano is of no consequence to the modem debate. Encoding and 
exemplification theses have been important foci in the contemporary debate over Aristotle’s theory of perception. (See 
note 3, above.) And, given that Aristotle many times claims that perception and thought are similar, it makes perfect 
sense for us, in studying Aristotle's account of thought, to consider the possibility that theses of encoding or 
exemplification play a role in Aristotle’s analysis.
23 One might argue that this cannot be a legitimate Aristotelian constraint, since Aristotle requires that the 
matter of an organ possess the same property that the external medium possesses in virtue of being the medium (the eye 
must be transparent, etc.) and this property can be realized in a number of sorts of matter (both water and air are 
transparent, etc.). Thus, (it may be argued) Aristotle is open to the conceptual possibility that not only could eyes be made 
of either air or water, but the same (say) watery organ could be both an eye and an ear. (This finds additional support on 
the traditional reading of DA IH .l. For a persuasive attack on the traditional reading see Tim Maudlin, “De Anima III 1: 
Is any Sense Missing?”, Phronesis. XXX (1986), n .l, pp.51-67.) However, there are clear indications that Aristotle 
requires much more of the matter of an organ than that it be akin to the relevant medium. In the De Sensu (DS) he argues 
that the eye must be composed of water and not of air, since water is more easily confined and controlled (see 438al3-17) 
and in the DA he suggests that the ear must be composed of air and not of water, since sound does not travel through 
water as well as it does through air (see 419bl8-20). This shows that constraint (2) is a legitimate Aristotelian constraint.
24 In DS 3, Aristotle claims that transparency is in fact not special to certain sorts of matter, rather everything is 
transparent in one degree or another (see 439al8-27). I take this to imply both that no thing is purely non-transparent 
and that no thing is purely transparent. From the latter it follows that no eye is a perfect mirror of the visible world.
14
25 Aristotle's argument here is markedly similar to Anaxagoras' argument in support of the claim that intellect is 
unmixed. Anaxagoras states, “Mind [...] is mixed with nothing [...] for if it were not by itself, but was mixed with 
anything else [...] the things that were with it would hinder it so that it could rule nothing.” (DK 59B12). In each of these 
arguments the unmixedness of intellect follows from the supposition that if  it were mixed its capacity would be limited. 
Cherniss suggests that Aristotle is not justified in interpreting Anaxagoras' “ruling all things” to mean “knowing all 
things” (See his Aristotle’s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy. Cornell University Press, 1935, p.172, n.122). But one 
must question whether this is an apt criticism, for in DK 59B12 Anaxagoras does explicitly associate the ability of 
intellect to rule all things with its ability to knows all things.
26 For Anaxagoras this means that intellect has nothing in common with anything else, rather it is purely what it is and 
it is nothing else: intellect lacks any sort of material nature (see DK 59B12). One might argue that Aristotle is here simply 
embracing the theory of a predecessor and that he is thus not advancing an argument based on his own empirical and scientific 
concerns. I would reject this view for two reasons: (1) empirical considerations arising out his assessment of the distinguishing 
characteristics of intellect are what bring Aristotle to tentatively embrace a neo-Anaxagorian theory and (2) in the second half of 
DA m .4 Aristotle suggests that Anaxagoras’ own theory cannot be completely right, since it creates an unbridgeable gap between 
mind and its objects, (see 429b23-430a9) Aristotle’s worry that Anaxagoras fails to explain how it is that we ever come to think 
is prefigured in DA 1.2. (see 405b20-23)
27 Christopher Shields mistakenly supposes that, if  Aristotle’s justification for the claim that intellect grasps all 
things is directed upon the range of its potential objects, then his overriding concern is with the problem of blind-spots. 
Accordingly, Shields argues that Aristotle’s argument would rest on the thin observation that “if  nous is structured, there 
will be rae  form it cannot acquire”. (Shields, 1997, p.325; my emphasis) This consideration. Shields contends, does not 
seem forceful enough to motivate Aristotle’s claim that intellect is separable from the body (especially when the form that 
intellect could not acquire would be the form that it already has and, thus, it would become unclear why intellect needs to 
acquire that form in order to think that very same form; see Shields, p.329). This is one reason why Shields rejects the 
view that it is a concern over the range of potential objects of intellect that motivates Aristotle’s claim that intellect grasps 
all things. Aristotle, however, is concerned not only with the possibility of blind-spots (a constraint (1) concern). He is 
concerned with issues connected with constraint (21 and constraint (31. These concerns (as we shall see) do ultimately 
motivate his claim that intellect is separable from the body.
28 Aristotle’s claim that intellect has no organ (429a27) should not be taken simply as the (false) empirical claim 
that as a matter of observational biology no organ of thought has been found. (On this view it would be most peculiar of 
him to say that it is consequently (merely) reasonable to consider intellect to be unmixed with the body; see Shields 1997, 
pp.307-8 & 313-4.) Rather, Aristotle is arguing that, in light of his own assessment of the distinguishing characteristics 
of intellect, it is now unlikely that intellect has an organ.
29 t o  Shields, 1997, pp.320-322 & 329.
30 Aristotle attempts to solve this problem at the end of DA ΠΙ.4. (see 430al-5) Wedin is correct to argue that the 
solution proposed there is offered “strictly in terms of the language in which [...] [the problem is] [...] set”. (Wedin, 1988, 
p. 167) The solution foils to address the question of how it is that we come to think. It is only when Aristotle turns to the 
issue of the organization of intellect (in DA IH.5) that a substantial response to the problem emerges, (see Wedin, 1988, 
pp. 169-195) While I agree in broad outline with Wedin’s assessment of the relation between DA IH.4 and DA ΙΠ .5,1 
disagree with much of his analysis of DA IH.5. (see note 10, above) For an alternative account of the relation between DA 
IH.4 and DA HL5, see Victor Caston, “Aristotle’s Two Intellects: A Modest proposal” (forthcoming).
31 See my 1996, pp.147-157.
32 This paper was written with the support of a summer grant from the College of William and Mary. Earlier 
versions were presented at the College of William and Maty (April, 1997), the Conference on Aristotle and Contemporary 
Science. Thessaloniki, Greece (September, 1997), and the 59th annual meeting of the Virginia Philosophical Association, 
Newport News, Virginia (October, 1998). I would like to thank Rob Bolton for his sustained criticism and 
encouragement.
